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Abstract
This paper aims to provide a systemic analysis to social opinion dynamics subject to individual
biases. As a generalization of the classical DeGroot social interactions, defined by linearly coupled dy-
namics of peer opinions that evolve over time, biases add to state-dependent edge weights and therefore
lead to highly nonlinear network dynamics. Previous studies have dealt with convergence and stability
analysis of such systems for a few specific initial node opinions and network structures, and here we
focus on how individual biases affect social equilibria and their stabilities. First of all, we prove that
when the initial network opinions are polarized towards one side of the state space, node biases will
drive the opinion evolution to the corresponding interval boundaries. Such polarization attraction effect
continues to hold under even directed and switching network structures. Next, for a few fundamen-
tal network structures, some important interior network equilibria are presented explicitly for a wide
range of system parameters, which are shown to be locally unstable in general. Particularly, the interval
centroid is proven to be unstable regardless of the bias level and the network topologies.
Keywords. Opinion dynamics, Complex networks, Nonlinear systems
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Understanding how opinions of the members in our society evolve during their interactions that take place
online or in daily lives is becoming increasingly important in many aspects ranging from political decisions
to marketing strategies [12, 14, 17, 28]. In various cases, social opinions can be represented by real numbers,
and by individuals averaging those numbers with neighbors the classical DeGroot’s model was established
[10]. When the social network structure admits sufficient connectivity, it was shown that DeGroot type
of social interactions often leads to convergence to a common opinion, namely agreement or consensus,
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across the entire society [33, 18, 27]. The significance of social agreement can be made clear through the
notion of naive learning in the sense that a social agreement, even not at the perfect average, implies
asymptotic learning of a hidden variable with sufficiently flat interconnections, when nodes’ opinions are
independently sampled in the first place [15].
In practical social networks, however, DeGroot social interactions are arguably rare since it is difficult to
observe social agreement [11, 20, 14]. As a result, a number of generalized models were proposed to capture
different psychological effects behind social interactions. Peers might put weight on their initial opinions
throughout the entire social interactions as memory effects [13]; nodes might only interact with peers that
hold opinions within a given range compared to their own opinions [16, 22]; a portion of nodes may be
stubborn who never revise their initial beliefs [1, 36]; nodes may tend to be repulsive towards enemies by
carrying out negative interactions [2, 3, 30, 31]. It turned out, beyond asymptotic stability, social dynamics
can exhibit complex behaviors such as clustering and oscillation [6, 3, 31], being consistent with studies
from social and political science [26, 25]. In fact, nonlinear bifurcations can arise from collective dynamics
of interconnected agents as a way of gaining survival advantage [21].
1.2 The Model
Consider a social network with n individuals (nodes) indexed in the set V = {1, . . . , n}. The structure of
the social network is represented by an undirected graph G = (V,E), where each edge {i, j} ∈ E is an
unordered pair of two different nodes in the set V. The graph G is assumed to be connected without loss
of generality. Each i ∈ V holds an opinion xi(t) ∈ R at slotted time t = 0, 1, 2, .... Node i interacts with
the neighbors in the set Ni :=
{{i, j} ∈ E}. The influence strength between two neighboring nodes i and
j is represented by wij > 0 and then di :=
∑
j∈Ni wij is the total weight of influence applied to node i.
Note that with connectivity, Ni is non-empty for any i and thus di > 0, i ∈ V. The node i’s self-confidence
is represented by wii > 0. Let
si(t) :=
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t)
be the external evidence received by node i at time t. Let bi be a positive number associated with node i
as a bias index. The evolution of the xi(t), i ∈ V is described as follows:
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) + x
bi
i (t)si(t)
wii + x
bi
i (t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)bi(di − si(t)) . (1)
This model, introduced in [9], describes the bias of node i towards the external evidence si(t) compared
to its own opinion xi(t), as reflected in their respective weights in the update rule. The initial values
xi(0), i ∈ V are assumed to be in the interval [0, 1]. The level of bias associated with node i is reflected in
the value of bi as a smaller bi indicates less biased opinion evolution in the sense that the node dynamics
becomes closer to the DeGroot model. It is easy to verify by induction that xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all time
instants onwards. However, as an intriguing generalization to the DeGroot model, the high nonlinearity in
(1) imposes fundamental obstacles in establishing further characterizations on the asymptotical behavior
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of the network dynamics, where only limited results were obtained for very special initial values and
network structures [20, 9].
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we attempt to provide a systemic analysis to the social opinion dynamical model (1) with a
focus on how individual biases affect social equilibria and their stabilities. First of all, we prove that when
the initial network opinions are polarized towards one side of the state interval, such polarization will be
persisted and amplified by node biases during the opinion evolutions in the sense that all node states will
converge to the corresponding interval boundaries. Such polarization attraction is shown to exist under
even directed and switching network structures. Next, we investigate the bias-induced equilibria of the
collective nonlinear network dynamics. For fundamental network structures such as complete, star, and
cycle graphs, the equilibria are presented explicitly for a wide range of system parameters. The given
equilibria are also shown to be locally unstable in general. Particularly, the interval centroid is shown to
be always unstable regardless the choice of bias level and network topologies. These results add to new
understandings of the stability analysis in [9], going beyond specific initial node opinions despite the high
nonlinearity of the network dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the polarization attraction
effect including the generalizations to directed and switching network stuctures. Section 3 moves on to
investigate the new equilibria that arise from the nonlinear network dynamics for both their positions and
stabilities. Finally some concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
Notation. For a vector X = (x1, ..., xn)
> ∈ Rn, we use ‖X‖ to denote its 2-norm, i.e., ‖X‖=
√∑n
i=1 x
2
i .
For any x ∈ R, bxc represents the largest integer that is no larger than x, and dxe represents the smallest
integer that is no smaller than x.
2 Polarization Attraction
In this section, we establish the polarization effect of the system (1) when individual opinions are collec-
tively polarized towards one side of the opinion space.
2.1 Exponential Polarization
We present the following result.
Theorem 1 Let bi > 0 for all i ∈ V.
(i) Suppose xi(0) ∈ [0, 1/2) for all i ∈ V. Then limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 for all i ∈ V with
xi(t) ≤
(
1− α
2
)t
max
j∈V
xj(0),
where α = min
k∈V
dk
wkk+dk
[(
1−max
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk − (max
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk] ∈ (0, 1].
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(ii) Suppose xi(0) ∈ (1/2, 1] for all i ∈ V. Then limt→∞ xi(t) = 1 for all i ∈ V with∣∣xi(t)− 1∣∣ ≤ (1− β
2
)t∣∣min
j∈V
xj(0)− 1
∣∣,
where β = min
k∈V
dk
wkk+dk
[(
min
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk − (1−min
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk] ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. We consider result (i) at first and divide its proof into two steps.
Step 1. Let y(t) = max
i∈V
{
xi(t)
}
. In this step, we prove that y(t) is decreasing. We define
f i1(t) = wii + x
bi
i (t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)bi(di − si(t)),
f i2(t) = wii
(
xi(t)− y(t)
)
,
f i3(t) = x
bi
i (t)si(t)
(
1− y(t))− (1− xi(t))bi(di − si(t))y(t),
f i4(t) = y(t)
(
1− y(t))[xbii (t)− (1− xi(t))bi].
For the f ij(t), j = 1, 2, 3, 4, the following facts can be established.
(a) From
si(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t) ≤
∑
j∈Ni
wijy(t) = diy(t)
and xi(t) ≤ y(t) < 1/2, there holds that f i1(t) > 0.
(b) The definition of y(t) implies that f i2(t) ≤ 0.
(c) If 0 ≤ si(t) ≤ diy(t), there holds that f i3(t) ≤ dif i4(t).
(d) If bi > 0 and y(t) < 1/2 hold, we obtain that xi(t) ≤ y(t) < 1/2 and f i4(t) ≤ 0.
From system (1), for all i ∈ V and y(t) < 1/2, we obtain
xi(t+ 1)− y(t)
=
wiixi(t) + x
bi
i (t)si(t)− wiiy(t)− xbii (t)si(t)y(t)−
(
1− xi(t)
)bi(di − si(t))y(t)
wii + x
bi
i (t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)bi(di − si(t))
=
f i2(t) + f
i
3(t)
f i1(t)
≤f
i
2(t) + dif
i
4(t)
f i1(t)
≤0, (2)
where the first inequation holds with (a), (c) and the second one holds with (b), (d). Therefore we have
proved that if y(t) < 1/2, there hold
xi(t+ 1) ≤ y(t)
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for all i ∈ V and
y(t+ 1) = max
i∈V
{
xi(t+ 1)
} ≤ y(t) < 1/2.
Hence, when y(0) < 1/2, we conclude that y(t) < 1/2 for all t ≥ 0 and {y(t)} is decreasing.
Step 2. We will prove that
{
y(t)
}
converges to zero and establish a bound of the convergence rate. From
(2), we know
y(t)− xi(t+ 1) = − f
i
2(t) + f
i
3(t)
f i1(t)
≥ − 1
wii + di
(
f i2(t) + f
i
3(t)
)
≥ − di
wii + di
f i4(t),
where the first inequation holds due to the facts that xbii (t) ≤ 1 and
(
1 − xi(t)
)bi ≤ 1, while the second
inequation holds in view of the fact that f i2(t) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ V and t ≥ 0.
Because xi(t) ≤ y(t) ≤ y(0) < 1/2, there hold(
1− xi(t)
)bi − xbii (t) ≥ (1− y(0))bi − ybi(0) > 0,
and
−f i4(t) = −y(t)
(
1− y(t))[xbii (t)− (1− xi(t))bi] ≥ [(1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y(t)(1− y(t)).
This therefore gives us
xi(t+ 1) ≤ y(t)− di
wii + di
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y(t)(1− y(t)). (3)
Introduce α = min
k∈V
dk
wkk+dk
[(
1−y(0))bk−ybk(0)]. Obviously 0 < α ≤ 1. Because y(t+1) = max
i∈V
{
xi(t+1)
}
and (3) holds for all i ∈ V, we obtain
y(t+ 1) ≤ y(t)− αy(t)(1− y(t)) = (1− α)y(t) + αy2(t) ≤ (1− α)y(t) + α
2
y(t) =
(
1− α
2
)
y(t).
Therefore, for all i ∈ V,
xi(t) ≤ y(t) ≤
(
1− α
2
)t
y(0) =
(
1− α
2
)t
max
j∈V
xj(0).
This proves (i). holds. The statement (ii) follows from a similar argument, whose details are omitted. Now
we have completed the proof. 
Note that Theorem 1 demonstrates the fundamental difference between the DeGroot type of social
interactions and the nonlinear opinion dynamics (1). Particularly, DeGroot model defines contraction
mappings in the opinion space [34, 5, 7], where the metric
max
i∈V
xi(t)−min
i∈V
xi(t)
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is monotonically decreasing for any network structure. With a fixed interaction structure, convergence
of DeGroot model can be explained by spectrum of the state transition matrix from standard linear
systems theory [35], however, the contraction nature of the DeGroot dynamics is certainly beyond that
which holds true even under random node interactions [17, 29] or nonlinear edge weights [27, 4, 23].
The proof of Theorem 1 illustrates that maxi∈V xi(t) is no longer contracting along (1). Instead, when
maxi∈V xi(t) < 1/2, the entire network dynamics will be pushed to the boundary of the opinion space.
2.2 Directed and Switching Graph
We now generalize Theorem 1 to networks with directed and switching structures. To this end, let G(t) =(
V,E(t)
)
be a time-varying directed graph where at time t, the edge set E(t) consists of some directed
arcs as ordered pairs from the set V. Node i’s self-confidence at time t is wii(t), and the arc (j, i) ∈ E(t)
holds a weight wij(t). The neighbor set of node i at time t is in turn defined as
Ni(t) :=
{
j : (j, i) ∈ E(t)}.
Let si(t) :=
∑
j∈Ni(t)wij(t)xj(t) and di(t) :=
∑
j∈Ni(t)wij(t). The network dynamics becomes
xi(t+ 1) =
wii(t)xi(t) + x
bi
i (t)si(t)
wii(t) + x
bi
i (t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)bi(di(t)− si(t)) , i ∈ V. (4)
We impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The following hold for the system (4).
(i) there exist wii ≥ 0, i ∈ V such that wii(t) ≤ wii for all t ≥ 0 and all i ∈ V;
(ii) there exits c > 0 such that di(t) ≥ c whenever di(t) > 0 for all i ∈ V;
(iii) there is T ∈ N+ such that ∑t+T−1s=t di(s) > 0 for any t ≥ 0 and i ∈ V.
It turns out, the polarization effect continues to exist under this directed and time-varying node interac-
tions, as shown in the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the following statements hold true.
(i) If xi(0) ∈ [0, 1/2) for all i ∈ V, then limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 for all i ∈ V with
xi(t) ≤
(
1− α∗
2
)bt/T c
max
j∈V
xj(0),
where α∗ = min
k∈V
c
wkk+c
[(
1−max
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk − (max
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk] ∈ (0, 1].
(ii) If xi(0) ∈ (1/2, 1] for all i ∈ V, then limt→∞ xi(t) = 1 for all i ∈ V with∣∣xi(t)− 1∣∣ ≤ (1− β∗
2
)bt/T c∣∣min
j∈V
xj(0)− 1
∣∣,
where β∗ = min
k∈V
c
wkk+c
[(
min
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk − (1−min
j∈V
xj(0)
)bk] ∈ (0, 1].
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Proof. (i). We continue to use the definition y(t) = max
i∈V
{
xi(t)
}
. Furthermore, we define
y˜(m) = max
mT≤h≤(m+1)T−1
{
y(h)
}
= max
mT≤h≤(m+1)T−1,
i∈V
xi(h),
where m ∈ N. For all i ∈ V, if di(t) = si(t) = 0, there holds xi(t + 1) = xi(t). When di(t) > 0 and
y(t) < 1/2, xi(t + 1) ≤ y(t) from (2). Therefore, from y(0) < 1/2, we conclude that for all i ∈ V and
t ≥ 0, y(t) < 1/2 for all t ≥ 0 and y(t) is decreasing. Then y˜(m) = y(mT ) holds and y˜(m) is decreasing.
We will prove that
{
y˜(m)
}
converge to zero and establish the convergence rate. Let t˜ ∈ [mT,∞) where
m ∈ N such that di(t˜) > c > 0. We see
xi(t˜+ 1) ≤ y(t˜)− di(t˜)
wii(t˜) + di(t˜)
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y(t˜)(1− y(t˜))
≤ y(t˜)− di(t˜)
wii + di(t˜)
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y(t˜)(1− y(t˜)).
Furthermore, when t ∈ [mT,∞), in view of di(t)wii+di(t)
[(
1−y(0))bi −ybi(0)] ∈ (0, 1] and y˜(m) ≥ y(t), there
holds
y(t)− di(t)
wii + di(t)
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y(t)(1− y(t))
≤ y˜(m)− di(t)
wii + di(t)
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y˜(m)(1− y˜(m)).
Therefore, we obtain
xi(t˜+ 1) ≤y˜(m)− di(t˜)
wii + di(t˜)
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y˜(m)(1− y˜(m))
≤y˜(m)− c
wii + c
[(
1− y(0))bi − ybi(0)]y˜(m)(1− y˜(m)). (5)
Because xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) when di(t) = 0, we conclude that
y˜(m+ 1) = max
(m+1)T≤h≤(m+2)T−1,
i∈V
xi(h) ≤ max
mT+1≤h≤(m+2)−1T,
di(h)>0,i∈V
xi(h) (6)
for all i ∈ V.
Introduce α∗ = min
m∈V
c
wmm+c
[(
1− y(0))bm − ybm(0)]. Obviously there holds 0 < α∗ ≤ 1. Due to (5) and
(6), we thus have
y˜(m+ 1) ≤ y˜(m)− α∗y˜(m)
(
1− y˜(m))
= (1− α∗)y˜(m) + α∗y˜2(m)
≤ (1− α∗)y˜(m) + α∗
2
y˜(m)
=
(
1− α∗
2
)
y˜(m).
for all m ∈ N. Therefore, for all i ∈ V, y˜(m) ≤ (1− α∗2 )my˜(0). From the definition of y˜(m), we know
xi(t) ≤
(
1− α∗
2
)bt/T c
max
j∈V
xj(0).
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(ii). The statement follows from the same analysis as in the proof of (i). We thus have completed the
proof. 
It is worth emphasizing that in Proposition 1, the two conditions (i)-(ii) of Assumption 1 are just
technical conditions which are consistent with standard DeGroot consensus algorithms [5, 7]. On the other
hand, the condition (iii) of Assumption 1 serves as a connectivity assumption. However, such connectivity
is significantly weaker than the usual connectivity assumptions for DeGroot consensus algorithm in the
sense that it only requires each node must be affected by some other node during the series of bounded
time intervals.
3 The Induced Equilibria
In this section, we investigate the bias-induced equilibria of the system (1). Clearly, the total number of
degrees of freedom is too high to facilitate a meaningful analysis given the bias levels bi and the node
weights wij . To ease the presentation, we impose the following assumption in this section.
Assumption 2 The following hold for the system (1):
(i) there is b > 0 such that bi = b for all i ∈ V;
(ii) wij = 1 for all {i, j} ∈ E;
(iii) wii = w ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V.
We assume the above assumption throughout the remainder of this section. Let E be the set of equilibria
of (1) and Ebdy = {X ∈ [0, 1]n\(0, 1)n : X ∈ E} be the set of boundary equilibria. It is clear that every
point in {0, 1}n is a boundary equilibrium. we introduce Eint = {X ∈ (0, 1)n : X ∈ E} as the set of interior
equilibria, which is certainly of more interest. Furthermore, denote X(t) =
(
x1(t),x2(t), ...,xn(t)
)>
. Recall
the following definition [19].
Definition 1 The equilibrium X = (x1, x2, ..., xn−1, xn)> of system (1) is locally stable if for every ε > 0
there exists a δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that ‖X(t)−X‖< ε for all t ≥ 0 whenever ‖X(0)−X‖< δ. Otherwise, the
equilibrium is called to be unstable.
3.1 Equilibria Distribution
For any equilibrium X, there holds that
xi =
wiixi + x
b
i
(∑
j∈Ni wijxj
)
wii + xbi
(∑
j∈Ni wijxj
)
+
(
1− xi
)b(
di − (
∑
j∈Ni wijxj)
) , i ∈ V
which is equivalent to
pi(x1, . . . , xn) := x
b
i
(
xi − 1
)( ∑
j∈Ni
wijxj
)
+ xi
(
1− xi
)b(
di −
( ∑
j∈Ni
wijxj
))
= 0, i ∈ V. (7)
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Here each pi(x1, . . . , xn) is a polynomial function.
We note that there exist methods from computational algebraic geometry [8] to find the solutions to (7).
Let C[x1, . . . , xn] denote all the complex polynomials over n variables x1, . . . , xn. For any set of polynomials
{q1, . . . , qs},
〈q1, . . . , qs〉[x1,...,xn] =
{ s∑
i=1
hiqi : h1, . . . , hs ∈ C[x1, . . . , xn]
}
,
is called the ideal generated by q1, . . . , qs. We set I = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉[x1,...,xn] and define
EI =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Cn : ∀g ∈ I, g(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
}
as solutions of the ideal I. It is easy to verify that EI is the same as E, and it turns out using Buchberger’s
Algorithm, we may be able to recursively obtain EI from solving single variable polynomial equations,
during which Sturm’s Theorem helps us find the exact number of solutions in [0, 1]n. The process of
Buchberger’s Algorithm is essentially finding a new generating set of polynomials of I which have simpler
forms in a similar fashion as Gaussian eliminations.
The 2n equilibria in the set {0, 1}n are also quite interesting as they are vertex equilibria in the opinion
space. Their stabilities would reflect stubborn and extreme social formations. We provide the following
example.
Example. Consider a cycle graph with 10 nodes subject to Assumption 2 with b = 3. The 210 vertex
equilibria are denoted by
Ever :=
{
(x1 . . . x10)
> : xi ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
The stability of each equilibrium in the set Ever is tested by randomization method: around each equilib-
rium a total of 100 initial values are selected randomly, where each coordinate of these initial values is
within 0.015 compared to the equilibrium; the algorithm is run for 104 steps and if the distance between
the resulting outcome and the equilibrium is always within three times of the initial distance for the 100
initial values, the equilibria is considered as stable. We denote
Ekver :=
{
(x1 . . . x10)
> : xi ∈ {0, 1},
10∑
i=1
xi = k
}
for k = 0, 1, . . . , 10. The subset of stable equilibria of Ekver is denoted by E
k
ver We define
p(k) =:
∣∣Ekver∣∣/∣∣Ekver∣∣
as the ratio of stable equilibria in the set Ekver. The plot of p(k) is shown in Figure 1.
The numerical result illustrates that in most cases of k, both stable and unstable equilibria exist in
the set Ekver. Moreover, p(k) is symmetric with respect to k = 5, which seems natural in view of the
construction of the set Ekver and the symmetry of a cycle graph.
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Figure 1: The ratio of stable equilibria in the set Ekver.
3.2 Main Results
Note that the graph G is a complete graph if {i, j} ∈ E for all i, j ∈ V; a star graph if E = {{i, n} : i =
1, 2, ..., n−1.}; and a cycle graph if E = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, ..., {n−1, n}, {n, 1}}. We use the convenience that
node nm+ k represents node k ∈ V for all m ∈ Z.
First of all, it can be easily seen that the opinion space centroid (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> is always an unstable
interior equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 2 hold. Then X = (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> is always an unstable equilibrium
of system (1).
When the underlying network structure is a complete graph, it can be shown that the set of interior
equilibria contains the singleton (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> only.
Theorem 2 Let G be a complete graph with n ≥ 3 subject to Assumption 2. Then
Eint =
{
(1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>
}
if b ≤ 1 or b = 2. Moreover, the equilibrium (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> is unstable.
For star and cycle graphs, a variety of new interior equilibria arises from the nonlinear network dynamics,
as presented in the following two results.
Theorem 3 Let G be a star graph subject to Assumption 2. Then the following statements hold.
(i) Eint =
{
(x1, x2, ..., xn−1, 1/2)> :
∑n−1
i=1 xi = (n− 1)/2, xi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ V\{n}
}
if b = 1;
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(ii) Eint =
{
(x1, x1, ..., x1, 1− x1)> : x1 ∈ (0, 1)
}
if b = 2;
(iii) Eint =
{
(1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>
}
if b 6= 1, 2.
Moreover, any equilibrium X ∈ Eint is unstable.
Theorem 4 Let G be a cycle graph subject to Assumption 2. Then the following statements hold.
(i) If b = 1 and n ≡ 1, 2 or 3(mod 4), Eint =
{
(1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>
}
;
(ii) If b = 1 and n ≡ 0(mod 4), Eint =
{
(a1, a2, 1− a1, 1− a2, a1, ..., 1− a1, 1− a2)> : a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1)
}
;
(iii) If b = 2 and n ≡ 1(mod 2), Eint =
{
(1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>
}
;
(iv) If b = 2 and n ≡ 0(mod 2), Eint =
{
(a, 1− a, a, 1− a, ..., a, 1− a)> : a ∈ (0, 1)}.
Moreover, any equilibrium X ∈ Eint is unstable for b = 1 or b = 2.
It appears to be extremely difficult in generalizing these results to networks with a less common struc-
ture. The reasoning comes from that the ideal generated by the polynomials in (7) depends on the network
structure in a highly nontrivial manner. While as we explained above, solving such systems of polynomial
equations are equivalent to solving such equations on the generated ideals of the polynomials [8]. Nonethe-
less, these results illustrate intriguing equilibria can indeed arise for the system (1). We conjecture that
the majority of the interior equilibria should be unstable.
3.3 Key Lemma
We define the invariance potential function as follows.
Definition 2 Let Assumption 2 hold. The invariance potential function of xi(t) ∈ (0, 1) is defined as
s∗
(
xi(t), b
)
=
(
1− xi(t)
)b−1
xb−1i (t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)b−1 .
We present the following key technical lemma indicating the role of the invariance potential function.
Lemma 1 Suppose that xi(t) ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ V. Then the following statements hold.
(i) xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) if and only if si(t)/di = s
∗(xi(t), b);
(ii) xi(t+ 1) > xi(t) if si(t)/di > s
∗(xi(t), b);
(iii) xi(t+ 1) < xi(t) if si(t)/di < s
∗(xi(t), b).
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Proof. (i). Since xi(t) ∈ (0, 1), there hold
(
1− xi(t)
) ∈ (0, 1),xbi(t) > 0 and (1− xi(t))b > 0. As a result,
xi(t) = xi(t+ 1)
⇐⇒ xi(t) = wxi(t) + x
b
i(t)si(t)
w + xbi(t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)b(
di − si(t)
)
⇐⇒ xb+1i (t)si(t) + xi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)b(
di − si(t)
)
= xbi(t)si(t)
⇐⇒
[
xbi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)
+ xi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)b]
si(t) = xi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)b
di
⇐⇒ si(t)
di
=
(
1− xi(t)
)b−1
xb−1i (t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)b−1 = s∗(xi(t), b).
This proves (i).
(ii). We calculate the partial derivative of xi(t+ 1) in system (1), that is,
∂xi(t+ 1)
∂si(t)
=
xbi(t)
[
w + xbi(t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)b(
di − si(t)
)]− (wxi(t) + xbi(t)si(t))[xbi(t)− (1− xi(t))b][
w + xbi(t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)b(
di − si(t)
)]2
=
[
xbi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)
+ xi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)b]
w + xbi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)b
di[
w + xbi(t)si(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)b(
di − si(t)
)]2
>0, (8)
when xi(t) ∈ (0, 1). Due to (i) and (8), we obtain when si(t) > s∗
(
xi(t), b
)
di, xi(t+ 1) > xi(t) holds.
(iii). the statement follows from the same analysis as in the proof of (ii).
The desired lemma thus holds. 
3.4 Proofs of Statements
3.4.1 Proof of Proposition 2
When xi(t) = 1/2 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n, we know that si(t) = di/2 for all i ∈ V. Thus,
xi(t+ 1) =
w/2 + (1/2)bdi/2
w + (1/2)bdi/2 + (1/2)bdi/2
= 1/2
for all i ∈ V. Therefore, we have proved that X = (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> is an equilibrium.
Next, we show that X = (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> is unstable. Let
X(0) = (1/2− θ, 1/2− θ, ..., 1/2− θ)>
where θ ∈ (0, 1/2). From Theorem 1, there holds limt→∞X(t) = (0, 0, ..., 0)>. It is clear from this point
(1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> cannot be a stable equilibrium. We have proved the desired result. 
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3.4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
From the definitions of complete graph and s∗(x, b), there hold∑n
k=1,k 6=i xk
n− 1 = s
∗(xi, b) =
(1− xi)b−1
xb−1i + (1− xi)b−1
(9)
and
n∑
k=1
xk =
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
xk + xi =
(n− 1)(1− xi)b−1
xb−1i + (1− xi)b−1
+ xi
for all i ∈ V. Let
gb(x) =
(n− 1)(1− x)b−1
xb−1 + (1− x)b−1 + x
for x ∈ (0, 1). This immediately gives us that ∑nk=1 xk = gb(xi) for all i ∈ V, and
d
dx
gb(x) = 1− (n− 1)(b− 1)(1− x)
b−2xb−2[
xb−1 + (1− x)b−1]2 .
When x ∈ (0, 1) and b ≤ 1, we conclude that
d
dx
gb(x) > 0
and thus gb(x) is monotonic. Consequently, in view of gb(xi) =
∑n
k=1 xk = gb(xj), there holds that xi = xj
for all i, j ∈ V when X ∈ Eint. Hence, we can assume xi = x˜ for all i ∈ V. According to (9) we know
x˜ =
(1− x˜)b−1
x˜b−1 + (1− x˜)b−1 ,
which implies x˜ = 1/2. We have now obtained that if b ≤ 1, the only interior equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>.
When x ∈ (0, 1) and b = 2, we have
d
dx
gb(x) < 0.
The fact that (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)> is the unique equilibrium can be established using a similar analysis.
Finally, the instability can be deduced from Proposition 2 directly. Now we have completed the proof. 
3.4.3 Proof of Theorem 3
(i). According to the definitions of s∗(x, b) and star graph, we obtain
s∗(xi, b) = xn, i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1;
s∗(xn, b) =
∑n−1
i=1 xi
n− 1 .
When b = 1, for all i ∈ V\{n}, there holds
xi =
wxi + xixn
w + xixn + (1− xi)(1− xn) . (10)
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In view of xi 6= 0 or 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1, (10) immediately gives us xn = 1/2. Besides, we have
s∗(1/2, 1) =
1
2
=
∑n−1
i=1 xi
n− 1 . (11)
From (11) it is easy to verity when b = 1, Eint =
{
(x1, x2, ..., xn−1, 1/2)> :
∑n−1
i=1 xi = (n − 1)/2, xi ∈
(0, 1) for all i ∈ V\{n}}.
Next, we prove the instability of any equilibrium X ∈ Eint. For any equilibrium X = (x1, x2, ..., xn−1, 1/2)
where
∑n−1
i=1 xi = (n− 1)/2 and xi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ V \ {n}, let xi(0) ∈ [0, xi) for all i ∈ V. Then we will
prove that xi(t) is decreasing when for all i ∈ V there holds that xi(t) ∈ [0, xi). We see
xn(t+ 1)− xn(t) =
xn(t)
(
1− xn(t)
)(
2sn(t)− dn
)
w + xn(t)sn(t) +
(
1− xn(t)
)(
dn − sn(t)
) ≤ 0, (12)
where the inequation holds because 2sn(t) = 2
∑n−1
i=1 xi(t) < 2 × n−12 = dn. Similiarly, for any i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n− 1}, we obtain
xi(t+ 1)− xi(t) =
xi(t)
(
1− xi(t)
)(
2xn(t)− di
)
w + xi(t)xn(t) +
(
1− xi(t)
)(
dn − xn(t)
) ≤ 0. (13)
Notice that xi(0) ∈ [0, xi), i ∈ V, we thus know xi(t) ∈ [0, xi) is decreasing for all i = 1, 2, ..., n and t > 0.
Let z(t) = mini∈V
{
xi(t)
}
. Then we have that z(t) is decreasing. From z(t) ≥ 0, there holds limt→∞ z(t) =
z∗ ≥ 0. Next we will prove that z∗ = 0. We can conclude the following results easily
z∗ ≤ xi(t) ≤ xi(0) < xi (14)
for all i ∈ V. Due to (12) and (14), we obtain
∣∣xn(t+ 1)− xn(t)∣∣ ≥ z∗(1− xn(0))((n− 1)−∑n−1i xi(0))
w + 12
n−1
2 + (1− z∗)2(n− 1)
= cn
where cn is a constant determined by w, z
∗ and xi(0), i ∈ V. When z∗ > 0, we have that cn > 0 and then
limt→∞ xn(t) = −∞ < 0 monotonously. This immediately gives us a contradiction. Therefore, we know
that z∗ = 0. It means that there exists j ∈ V such that limt→∞ xj(t) = 0. From the monotonous decrease
of xj(t), we know that when ε =
1
2 mini∈V xi > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that xj(t) < ε and
∥∥X(t)−X∥∥ ≥∣∣xj(t) − xj∣∣ > 12 mini∈V xi = ε when t > N . For any small enough δ > 0, let xi(0) = xi − δn ∈ [0, xi) and
then
∥∥X(0)−X∥∥ = δ√
n
< δ. But limt→∞
∥∥X(t)−X∥∥ > ε. This immediately gives us that when b = 1 such
equilibria are unstable from the definition of unstability.
(ii). When b 6= 1, for all i ∈ V\{n}, there holds
xi =
wxi + x
b
ixn
w + xbixn + (1− xi)b(1− xn)
.
Because b 6= 1 and xi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ V, we conclude that
wxi + x
b+1
i xn + xi(1− xi)b(1− xn) = wxi + xbixn,
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which implies
xi =
1
( xn1−xn )
1/(b−1) + 1
for all i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1. Therefore, xi = x1 for all i ∈ V\{n}.
We now know that
x1 =
(n− 1)x1
(n− 1) = s
∗(xn, b) =
(1− xn)b−1
(1− xn)b−1 + xb−1n
,
xn = s
∗(x1, b) =
(1− x1)b−1
(1− x1)b−1 + xb−11
.
Therefore, we obtain
x1
1− x1 =
(1− xn
xn
)b−1
,
xn
1− xn =
(1− x1
x1
)b−1
.
(15)
If b = 2, it must be the case that x1 + xn = 1 where x1, xn ∈ (0, 1) from (15). Now, we can verity for b = 2
Eint =
{
(x1, x1, ..., x1, 1− x1)> : x1 ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
Now, we prove the instability of any equilibrium X ∈ Eint when b = 2. For the equilibrium X =
(a, a, ..., a, 1 − a)> where a ∈ (0, 1), let x1(0) = x2(0) = ... = xn−1(0) ∈ [0, a) and xn(0) ∈ [0, 1 − a). We
show that x1(t) is decreasing when for all i ∈ V there holds that xi(t) ∈ [0, xi). We have
x1(t+ 1)− x1(t) =
x1(t)
(
1− x1(t)
)[
x1(t)xn(t)−
(
1− x1(t)
)(
1− xn(t)
)]
w + x21(t)xn(t) +
(
1− x1(t)
)2(
1− xn(t)
) ≤ 0,
where the inequation holds because 0 < x1(t) < a < 1 − xn(t) and 0 < xn(t) < 1 − a < 1 − x1(t).
Analogously, we have that for all i ∈ V, xi(t) is decreasing when x1(0) = ... = xn−1(0) ∈ [0, a) and
xn(0) ∈ [0, 1 − a). Then we can also prove that limt→∞mini∈V
{
xi(t)
}
= 0 and limt→∞
∥∥X(t) − X∥∥ >
1
2 min{a, 1− a} for any X(0) satisfying that x1(0) = ... = xn−1(0) ∈ [0, a) and xn(0) ∈ [0, 1− a). We thus
obtain that X is unstable similarly to the case in (i).
(iii). From (15), there holds
x1
1− x1 =
( x1
1− x1
)(b−1)2
(16)
when b 6= 1. Recall that b > 0 and b 6= 2, we obtain (b − 1)2 6= 1 and the solutions of equation (16)
are given by x11−x1 be either 0 or 1. Due to x1 = ... = xn−1 ∈ (0, 1), this immediately gives us that
x1 = ... = xn−1 = 1/2. We can therefore readily conclude that xn = 1/2 from (15). Thus when b 6= 1 or 2,
the only interior equibrium is (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>. From Proposition 2, there holds that (1/2, ..., 1/2)> is
unstable.
We therefore have completed the proof. 
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3.4.4 Proof of Theorem 4
(i). In view of Lemma 1 and the definition of cycle graph, we have
xi−1 + xi+1
2
= s∗(xi, b) =
(1− xi)b−1
(1− xi)b−1 + xb−1i
, (17)
for all i ∈ V. When b = 1 and n ≡ 1(mod 4), according to (17), we know
xi + xi+2 = 1 and xi+2 + xi+4 = 1, (18)
for all i ∈ V. Therefore, we obtain that xi = xi+4k for all i ∈ V and k ∈ Z. Due to n ≡ 1(mod 4),
let n = 4m + 1 where m ∈ N. Then we have that xi = xi+4m = xi−1 for all i ∈ V. This gives us that
x1 = x2 = ... = xn. From (18), xi = 1/2 holds for all i ∈ V. The only equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2, ..., 1/2)>
when b = 1 and n ≡ 1(mod 4). If n = 4m + 2 or n = 4m + 3, the results can be obtained analogously.
From Proposition 2, there holds that (1/2, ..., 1/2)> is unstable.
(ii). When b = 1 and n ≡ 0(mod 4), let
xi = a1,when i ≡ 0(mod 4);
xi = a2,when i ≡ 1(mod 4);
xi = a3,when i ≡ 2(mod 4);
xi = a4,when i ≡ 3(mod 4)
where a1, a2, a3, a4 ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ V. Noting (18), there hold a1 + a3 = 1 and a2 + a4 = 1. Now, we can
verity when b = 1 and n ≡ 0(mod 4) all interior equilibria are X = (a1, a2, 1−a1, 1−a2, a1, ..., 1−a1, 1−a2)>
where a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1).
Next, we prove that when b = 1 and n ≡ 0(mod 4), the equilibrium X = (a1, a2, 1−a1, 1−a2, ..., 1−a2)>
where a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1) is unstable. Suppose xi+4k(0) = xi(0) for all k ∈ N and i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Besides, let
x1(0) < a1,x2(0) < a2,x3(0) < 1 − a1,x4(0) < 1 − a2. We will prove that xi(t) is decreasing for all
i = 1, 2, 3 and 4. We first show that x1(t) is decreasing when xi(t) ∈ [0, xi) for all i ∈ V. There holds
x1(t+ 1)− x1(t) =
2x1(t)
(
1− x1(t)
)(
s1(t)− 1
)
w + x1(t)s1(t) +
(
1− x1(t)
)(
2− s1(t)
) ≤ 0,
where the inequation holds because s1(t) = x2(t) + xn(t) < a2 + 1− a2 < 1. Analogously, xi(t), i = 2, 3, 4
are decreasing when xi(t) ∈ [0, xi) for all i ∈ V. Therefore, we obtain that xi(t) is decreasing when
xi(0) = xi+4k(0) ∈ [0, xi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, k ∈ N. Then we can also prove that limt→∞mini∈V
{
xi(t)
}
= 0
and limt→∞
∥∥X(t) − X∥∥ > 12 min{a1, a2, 1 − a1, 1 − a2} for any X(0) satisfying that xi(0) = xi+4k(0) ∈
[0, xi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, k ∈ N. We thus obtain that X = (a1, a2, 1− a1, 1− a2, ..., 1− a2)> where a1, a2 ∈ (0, 1)
is unstable similarly to the proof of Theorem 3. Therefore, we prove that such equilibria are unstable.
(iii). We now discuss the interior equilibria when b = 2. Let yi = xi + xi+1 for all i ∈ V. From (17) and
b = 2, we obtain
xi−1 + xi+1
2
= 1− xi,
16
for all i ∈ V. Therefore, there holds
yi + yi+1 = 2,
for all i ∈ V. Accordingly yi = yi+2k holds for all i ∈ V and k ∈ Z. When n = 2m + 1 where m ∈ N, we
obtain that yi = yi+2m = yi−1 for all i ∈ V. Therefore, we have that yi = 1 for all i ∈ V. That is,
xi + xi+1 = 1,
for all i ∈ V. Because n = 2m + 1 where m ∈ N, we see that xi = xi+2m = xi−1 for all i ∈ V. This
immediately gives us x1 = x2 = ... = xn = 1/2. From Proposition 2, there holds that (1/2, ..., 1/2)
> is
unstable.
(iv). When b = 2 and n = 2m where m ∈ N, let
yi = a˜,when i ≡ 0(mod 2);
yi = 2− a˜,when i ≡ 1(mod 2)
where a˜ ∈ (0, 2) for all i ∈ V. In view of the definition of yi, we know that
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑m
i=1 y2i−1 =
∑m
i=1 y2i.
Therefore, we get that ma˜ = m(2− a˜) and a˜ = 1. This tolds us
xi + xi+1 = 1
for all i ∈ V. Because n = 2m, we know that xi = xi+2k for all i ∈ V and k ∈ N. We thus conclude that
Eint =
{
(a, 1 − a, a, 1 − a, ..., a, 1 − a)> : a ∈ (0, 1)} when b = 2 and n ≡ 0(mod 2). The instability of
(a, 1− a, a, 1− a, ..., a, 1− a)> can be proved similarly to the statement (ii) in Theorem 3. This completes
the proof. 
4 Conclusions
We have provided a systemic analysis to social opinion dynamics subject to individual biases, which
generated state-dependent edge weights and therefore highly nonlinear network dynamics. It was shown
that when the initial network opinions are polarized towards one side of the state space, node biases
would drive the opinion evolution to the corresponding interval boundaries under quite general network
conditions. For a few fundamental network structures, some important interior network equilibria were
presented for a wide range of system parameter in terms of their positions and stabilities, where the
interval centroid was proven to be unstable regardless of the bias level and the network topologies. Future
work includes studies of the distribution and stability of equilibria under more general network structures,
especially those that are resilient subject to network structure switches as such structure change is common
for real-world social networks.
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